Abstract-In wireless networks, a recent trend is to make spectrum access dynamic for efficient utilization of spectrum. In such a scenario, the spectrum is periodically allocated to wireless users using an auction-based market mechanism. A critical property required for designing such a mechanism is truthfulness, which could avoid market manipulation. Such mechanism design typically involves solving NP-hard problems; hence, approximation algorithms are always resorted to in real systems. However, recent results have suggested that it is impossible to implement reasonable approximations without losing robustness to manipulation. In this paper, we solve the problem in a novel perspective by relaxing the constraints of ensuring strong truthfulness. We discuss the concepts of approximate truthfulness and provide approximately truthful mechanisms to improve efficiency (in terms of social welfare and spectrum utilization). We first develop a computationally efficient mechanism that achieves truthful in expectation. This mechanism is based on the assumption that bidders are risk neutral. Following that, we break the assumption by proposing a hard-to-manipulate auction (HMA), which makes it hard to manipulate the auction for profit gains. Our extensive simulation results show that our mechanisms can achieve significant improvement over the state-of-the-art mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
R ADIO spectrum is a critical but scarce resource for wireless communications. The usage of the spectrum has long been managed by government agencies (e.g., Federal Communications Commission in the U.S.), who allocate spectrum by assigning licenses. Only licensed users are allowed to use the spectrum. Such kind of spectrum allocation policy is in a very long-term fashion with space-time invariance. Recently, with the fast development of wireless devices and applications, it has been widely recognized that the spectrum is becoming increasingly crowded under the long-term and exclusive management policy. However, it has been widely understood that most of the licensed spectrum is underutilized [1] , [2] .
With the advances in cognitive radio techniques, dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been proposed to address the above dilemma [3] , [4] . Under DSA, licensed users (called primary users) are encouraged to open up their idle spectrum to unlicensed users (called secondary users). It is a win-win situation because primary users can obtain financial gains by leasing their idle spectrum and the service requirements of secondary users can be satisfied. Auctions are widely accepted as an efficient approach to redistribute spectrum among users due to the perceived fairness and allocation efficiency [5] . Recently, designing auctions for redistributing the spectrum among secondary users [called secondary spectrum auction (SSA)] has attracted much research interest [11] - [16] .
A typical SSA is made up of a lot of small secondary users distributed over a relatively small geographic region. As a result, an efficient SSA is required to be quickly conducted. In addition, spectrum reusability can be exploited to improve spectrum utilization, which means that the same spectrum band can be allocated to multiple well-separated bidders. Spectrum reusability constitutes the fundamental difference between spectrum auctions and conventional goods auctions (e.g., painting auctions). A critical property required for designing auction, including spectrum auction, is truthfulness (i.e., strategy-proofness). Truthful auction could avoid market manipulation, which is a deliberate attempt to interfere with the free and fair operation of the market and to create artificial, false, or misleading appearances with respect to the price of market. Truthfulness makes life easier for bidders. Otherwise, each bidder has to figure out the others' bidding strategies before being able to get an optimal bidding strategy for herself.
One of the most attractive solutions to the above problem is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [17] - [19] , which has advantages of being truthful and allocative efficient (it maximizes the value of the allocation over all bidders) [33] . However, such solution has the following problems. First, exploiting spectrum reusability leads to addressing the interference constraints, which make the problem of finding optimal spectrum allocation be NP-hard [7] . Therefore, approximate algorithms are always resorted in practical. However, approximate algorithms make ensuring truthfulness via VCG impossible [22] . This is because the VCG mechanism fails to be truthful when one does not have access to optimal solution [9] , [10] . On another hand, traditional truthful auctions, e.g., k-position [24] , will lose truthfulness or become computationally prohibitive when applied to spectrum auctions due to the spatial reuse of spectrum, i.e., a spectrum band can be assigned to multiple well-separated bidders [7] , [14] .
As the problem of finding the optimal spectrum allocation under interference constraints is NP-hard, we introduce the concept of approximate truthfulness to release the burden of providing strong truthfulness. Approximate truthfulness is sufficient to guarantee bidders not to lie during auctions [22] , [25] . Moreover, it is helpful to make the mechanism designer focus on designing efficient allocation algorithm to improve allocative efficiency (including social welfare and spectrum utilization) [8] . We first propose a computationally efficient mechanism that achieves truthful in expectation. It guarantees any bidder cannot gain positive profit in expectation from nontruthful bid. In this situation, bidders are assumed risk neutral, i.e., bidders will have no preference between risk aversion and risk seeking. Following that, we attempt to break this assumption by relaxing truthfulness to a type of hardness of manipulation, which guarantees that it is NP-hard to gain at least any nonnegative profit from nontruthful bid for any bidder. In this situation, we move the difficulty of manipulation from the mechanism to the manipulators, thereby achieving a reasonable and tractable mechanism.
In this paper, we first provide a near optimal algorithm via linear programming (LP). The algorithm is shown to be monotone; thus, a novel pricing scheme is proposed to ensure the mechanism achieving truthful in expectation. Following that, we attempt local improvements on the monotone algorithm, which improves the economic efficiency but unravels the monotonicity. Therefore, the previous pricing scheme is no longer suitable. In this case, we show that such improved algorithm combined with a VCG-based payment scheme is hard to manipulate.
The concept of approximate truthfulness is first introduced in our conference paper [8] for spectrum auction design, where an auction achieving truthful in expectation for strict request model (named as ETEX) is proposed. ETEX is based on the assumption that bidders are risk neutral. This paper extends it mainly by proposing an additional approximately truthful mechanism that breaks the above assumption and improves efficiency.
The main contributions of our work in this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the concept of approximate truthfulness, which can release the burden of providing strong truthfulness to improve the allocation efficiency, for spectrum allocation in DSA. 2) We provide a near-optimal algorithm, and we combine it with a novel pricing method to ensure that the mechanism achieves truthful in expectation in polynomial complexity. 3) We attempt local improvements based on the monotone algorithm to improve allocation efficiency. Although the previous pricing method is unsuitable, we show that such an efficient algorithm combined with a VCG payment scheme is hard to manipulate.
4)
Through extensive simulations, we show that our mechanisms outperform existing truthful mechanisms by about 23%/27% on average in terms of social welfare and spectrum utilization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related work. Section III introduces the preliminaries on auctions. The network model and problem statement are given in Section IV. The auction achieving truthful in expectation is proposed in Section V. We analyze the properties of ETEX in Section VI. The hard-to-manipulate auction (HMA) is described in Section VII. Experimental results are shown in Section VIII. Section IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
How to efficiently allocate spectrum while enabling spectrum reuse has attracted great research interests. Gandhi et al. [12] proposed a real-time spectrum auction framework that considers interference constraints. To obtain computationally efficient mechanisms, they choose to linearize the interference constraints. Subramanian et al. [13] proposed a greedy-graphcoloring-based algorithm to approach the optimal revenue. However, these auctions do not consider truthfulness.
Zhou et al. [14] first investigate the design of truthful SSA and show that a greedy algorithm coupled with a VCG payment scheme will lose truthfulness. They propose VERITAS [14] , which consists of a greedy allocation algorithm and a critical-value-based pricing scheme. Recently, this work has been extended to consider double auctions [16] . In [21] , Li and Wu aimed to find a tradeoff between social welfare and fairness maintained. The other two works [15] , [20] attempt to maximize the expected revenue for cellular networks under Bayesian settings, wherein each bidder's valuation value is drawn from a known probability distribution. In another work, Wu et al. [32] designed a spectrum auction mechanism based on the VCG mechanism. However, their altered payment scheme destroys the truthfulness property. Moreover, their mechanism requires solving an integer LP (NP-hard) problem, which makes their approach impractical for large-scale networks.
As another line of related works, there has been considerable interest in recent years in characterizing approximately truthful combinatorial auctions in economics since the combinatorial allocation problem is both NP-complete [28] and inapproximable [29] . Feigenbaum and Shenker [30] defined the concept of strategically faithful approximations and proposed the study of approximation as an important direction for algorithmic mechanism design. Sanghvi and Parkes [25] forced a bidder to reveal information by making it too hard for that same bidder to avoid revelation, i.e., any attempt to backsolve the computation (to manipulate the result) will be difficult. Archer et al. [22] adopted similar notions of approximate truthfulness on singleminded combinatorial auctions and proposed a computationally efficient auction that achieves both truthful with error probability and truthful in expectation.
Inspired by these studies, we apply the approximate truthfulness in spectrum auction design to achieve a tradeoff between allocation efficiency and truthfulness.
III. PRELIMINARIES ON AUCTION
An auction M (A, P ) consists of an allocation algorithm A along with a pricing scheme P . All bidders submit the bids and requests to the auctioneer simultaneously. After collecting bid vector b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b N ) and demand vector d = (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d N ) from all bidders, the auctioneer determines the winning bidders and allocates goods to them according to the allocation algorithm A. A price p i will be charged from each winner i according to the pricing scheme P . For its requested goods, each bidder i has a true valuation v i , which is private for other bidders. The utility (i.e., profit) of each bidder i is computed as
where b −i represents the bidders' bids except bidder i, i.e.,
A common goal in the auction design is to maximize the social welfare, which is defined as the sum of bids submitted by all winners. In the following, we summarize the basic concepts and properties of truthful and approximately truthful auction mechanisms.
A. Truthful Auction Mechanisms
Since bidders are selfish, a bidder may choose to submit a bid b i (b i = v i ) to maximize its utility. An auction is truthful if, for any bidder i, the utility u i is maximized when bidding the true
Truthful auctions will guarantee that no bidders can obtain additional profit gains by lying on bids.
The VCG mechanism [17] - [19] is famous for securing truthful bids from bidders. A mechanism M (A, P ) belongs to the class of VCG mechanism if and only if the allocation algorithm A finds the optimal allocation that maximizes the social welfare and if the price charged from each bidder i is
where W A (b −i ) and W A (b) denote the optimal social welfare returned by running A with all bidders and all other bidders except i, respectively. Note that the VCG mechanism fails to be truthful when A does not get the optimal allocation [9] , [10] .
B. Approximately Truthful Auction Mechanisms
Recently, the approximate truthfulness has received considerable interest for combinatorial auction design in economics. In this paper, we introduce this concept to spectrum auction design. We consider two types of approximately truthful auctions: truthful in expectation and hard to manipulate, as defined in the following.
Definition 1 (Truthful in Expectation):
A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if, for each bidder i, the equa-
Definition 2 (Hard to Manipulate):
A mechanism is hard to manipulate if it is NP-hard for any bidder i to gain at least any nonnegative additional profit by lying on bids.
The truthful-in-expectation mechanism let lying bidders take risks of losing profit. Therefore, a bidder under such a mechanism is generally assumed risk neutral, i.e., a bidder is reluctant to bear the risk via lying. The hard-to-manipulate mechanism breaks the assumption by making it hard to manipulate the auction for profit gains. It moves the difficulty of the manipulation from the mechanism to the manipulators, which makes it hard for profit gain via lying.
IV. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Network Model
In general, we refer to the primary user and its associated secondary users as auctioneer and bidders, respectively. The set of bidders are denoted N (|N | = N ). The spectrum to be auctioned is divided into K identical channels denoted
A strict request model is adopted here, where each bidder will win either all d i channels or nothing. We consider sealed-bid auctions where all bidders simultaneously submit their bids to the auctioneer, and we assume that the bidders do no collude.
In this paper, we focus on the widely used protocol interference [6] , [7] , a succinct model to formulate the impact of interference within resource allocation problems, to highlight our contributions in auction mechanisms. With the protocol model employed, the interference can be well captured by a conflict graph G(N , E), where E is the collection of all edges [7] . An edge (i, j) belongs to E if bidders i and j conflict with each other when they use the same channel simultaneously. Let N(i) be the set of bidders that interfere with i (i.e., the neighboring nodes of i in G).
B. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we focus on maximizing social welfare, which is a strong indicator of how efficiently the buyers make use of the sold spectrum bands. We use the following binary variables x i and a ik to formally describe the allocation problem:
The channel allocation to achieve maximum social welfare can thus be formulated as an integer programming problem, i.e.,
Constraints in (6) ensure that the request is strict, i.e., a bidder obtains either d i or 0 channels. The interference constraints require that any two bidders i and j sharing an edge are not allowed to be assigned to the same channel, i.e., ∀ k ∈ K, a ik a jk = 0 if ∀ (i, j) ∈ E, which can be linearized by (7) due to the integer constraints in (8) . This optimization problem is named as spectrum allocation with strict request (SA-SR). The following theorem shows it is NP-hard and inapproximable.
Theorem 1: The SA-SR problem is NP-hard. Moreover, it does not admit any δ-approximation algorithm unless P = NP , where δ is some positive constant.
Proof: Consider a special case with d i = K = 1, ∀ i ∈ N , the channel will be allocated to an independent set in conflict graph (addressing interference constraints) with maximized summation of bidders' valuation. Therefore, finding the optimal social welfare for this case is equivalent to finding the maximum-weight independent set, where the weight of a node is the bid of a bidder. The maximum-weight independent set problem is known to be NP-hard, and it is also NP-hard to find a constant-factor approximate algorithm for this problem. The same results hold for the general SA-SR problem as well.
V. TRUTHFUL IN EXPECTATION
Here, we develop ETEX: an auction achieving truthful in expectation consisting of a suboptimal allocation algorithm (referred as ETEX-Allocation) and a novel pricing scheme (referred as ETEX-Pricing). Here, we assume bidders are risk neutral, i.e., bidders have no preference between risk aversion and risk seeking.
A. ETEX-Allocation Algorithm
The allocation algorithm starts by solving LP, and it finds a solution based on the LP solutions. The idea is similar with the solution of [31] , which approximates a routing problem where band is allocated to nodes according to the LP solution, which is close to being optimal. The ETEX-Allocation is based on the following strategy. First, it runs the LP relaxation of the problem. Second, it uses the LP results to rank the bidders. Finally, it sequentially allocates the channels to bidders based on the ranking order while satisfying interference constants.
The LP formulation for the problem (5) is simply substituting (8) by the following equation [see (9) ], and the other constraints stay unchanged:
Let B = {x * 1 , . . . , x * n }, where x * i is the LP solution of (5) for bidder i. We use B = Sort(B) to sort the set B in a descending order. We first use breadth-first-search procedure BFS(G) to sort the topology G(N , E), which ensures the updating process is executed sequentially. We then sequentially allocate channels to bidders from high to low according to the ordered solution set B . The procedure Top(B ) gets the first bidder in B . For each bidder i, if |Avai(i)|, which is the number of available channels of bidder i, is greater than the request d i , we then use Assign(i, d i ) to assign d i channels from Avai(i) to i. After allocating, we use the updating process Update(j) to remove the allocated channels from the available channel sets of bidder j for each j ∈ N(i). This process ensures that the interference constraints are satisfied.
We describe the detailed algorithm in Algorithm 1. In the following, we will show the ETEX-Allocation is monotone, which means that bidder i will win by bidding higher than b i if it wins by bidding b i .
Algorithm 1: ETEX-Allocation Algorithm.
Input:
The network, G (N , E) ; The bids vector, b;
The demand vector, d; Output:
A feasible spectrum allocation; 1: BFS(G); 2: Set Avai(i) = K for i ← 1 to N ; 3: Solve LP relaxation of (5) 
Update(j) for each j ∈ N(i); 10: end if 11: B = B \{x * i }; // remove the bidder i. 12: end while
B. ETEX-Pricing Scheme
A mechanism is truthful if and only if the allocation algorithm is monotone and the pricing method that guarantees the payment for any bidder i is its critical value [27] . The monotonicity property ensures that, if any bidder i wins by bidding b i , it will also win by bidding higher than b i . A monotone allocation algorithm implies that there is a critical value such that any bidder will win by bidding higher than this value and will lose by bidding lower than that value. Although ETEX-Allocation is monotone (see Lemma 3), a natural way of finding the single critical value requires binary search on the bid b i , which requires multiple times of running LP. Instead of providing exact critical value, in this paper, we develop a technique to find the payment approximately to achieve truthful in expectation. This greatly minimizes the computational overhead. The basic idea behind ETEX-Pricing scheme is finding the expected value of critical value for each winner.
In the pricing algorithm, we randomize the price for each winner i. Let random variable p i denote the randomized payment. The strategy for determining the value of p i is as follows: Select a random bid u i ∈ [0, b i ] uniformly, and run the ETEXAllocation once again with bidder i bidding u i (the other bidders' bids do not change). If the bidder i loses, then we set the payment p i = b i . Otherwise, i.e., bidder i still wins, we set p i = 0. The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm 2, where owned_ch is the number of channels currently owned by i. In the following, we will show that the expected value of the payment from bidder i is its critical value (see Lemma 4).
Algorithm 2: ETEX-Pricing Algorithm.
Input:
The network, G (N , E) 
VI. PROPERTIES ANALYSIS
In this paper, we evaluate the properties of mechanisms in terms of truthfulness and computational complexity. We first prove ETEX is truthful in expectation by showing the expected utility of each bidder i is maximized with truthful bidding, and then, we analyze the computational complexity of ETEX.
A. Truthfulness
To prove ETEX is truthful in expectation, we try to prove that ETEX-Allocation is monotone and ETEX-Pricing charges each bidder its expected critical value.
We first characterize the properties of the ETEX-Allocation algorithm. We start by establishing the following two lemmas. Proof: To simplify the description, we use S and S to denote the LP solution vector when bidding
Since S is the optimal solution to the linear program and S is a feasible solution, we have Similarly, we get
By adding (11) and (10) and moving the right part of (10) to the left and the left part of (11) to the right, we obtain the following:
where N(i) is the set of the neighboring bidders of i.
Proof: With Lemma 1, we get x i ≥ x i , which means bidder i will get more fractional spectrum when its bid increases, and the increased spectrum allocated to bidder i is Δd = (x i − x i )d i . Since (x −i , x i ) and (x −i , x i ) are both optimal solutions, bidder i's increased spectrum would result in decreasing the spectrum of its neighbors. Bidder i increases Δd; thus, one of its neighbor would reduce at most Δd spectrum according to the interference constraints, which means that other bidders can improve at most Δd when b i increases. We now assume that there exists one neighbor k of bidder i improves its LP solution, i.e., x k > x k . k can improve at most Δd spectrum, yet k's neighbor i have improved Δd spectrum; this means that k can no longer improve the spectrum by the interference constraints, i.e., if
With Lemmas 1 and 2, we can prove that the ETEXAllocation is monotone.
Lemma 3: The ETEX-Allocation algorithm is monotone, i.e., if bidder i wins by bidding b i , i will also win by bidding b i where b i > b i .
Proof: Consider two bidding lists where only bidder i's bid is different and the corresponding LP solutions are S and S , respectively (see Fig. 1 ). In S, the bidder i is allocated by bidding b i , and the corresponding LP solution is Y denote the sorted set of {y k , k ∈ N(i)} ∪ x i . The position of bidder i in Y is pos(x i ). We have y k ≤ y k , k ∈ N(i) by Lemma 2. Therefore, we get pos(x i ) ≥ pos(x i ). We know that only bidder i's neighbors would cause conflicts such that bidder i would not be allocated. Now, we prove our claim by contradiction. We assume bidder i loses by bidding b i , which means that a neighboring bidder with smaller position has caused conflict to bidder i in Y . Since pos(x i ) ≥ pos(x i ), the conflicting neighbor will also make bidder i not be allocated in Y according to allocation rule. This leads to a contradiction. Now, we characterize the properties of the ETEX-Pricing algorithm by showing that the charged price for each bidder i is the expected value of its critical value.
Lemma 4: Let p i be the random variable to denote payment charged from bidder i. The expected value of p i is its critical value c i , i.e., E[p i ] = c i .
Proof: We use Z i to denote the overall probability that i wins his desired channels and c i to denote the critical value. According to the definition of critical value, we know bidder i will be allocated with the requested channels when bidding b i > c i , where c i is its critical value. Otherwise, i will lose by bidding lower than c i . Therefore, we can describe Z i (b i , b −i ) as a step function of b i when fixing b −i , as shown in Fig. 2 . Note that b −i is fixed throughout this discussion; therefore, we suppress it in the notation for convenient. After that, according to the pricing strategy, it is easy to compute the expectation of the payment p i for winner i is c i according the following:
where Pr lose and Pr win denote the probability of losing and winning, respectively. Based on the characterizations of the allocation method and the pricing scheme, we now show that ETEX is truthful in expectation. With the ETEX-Allocation rule and the pricing scheme, we obtain the following.
Theorem 2: The ETEX is truthful in expectation. Proof: Let v i be the truthful bidding of bidder i and b i be the bidding such that b i = v i . We have the following two cases according to whether bidder i loses or wins.
• Case 1: i loses by bidding b i ; then, i will also lose by bidding v i by Lemma 3. Therefore, the utility of bidder
• Case 2: i wins by bidding b i . If i also wins by bidding v i because the payment of critical value is the same, then
If i loses by bidding v i , then the critical value c i must be greater than v i . Therefore, the utility by bidding
In both cases, we have Note that we use Karmarkars algorithm to obtain the LP solution in this paper. Karmarkars algorithm belongs to the interior point method, which generates a sequence of points inside the feasible region and finally approaches the optimal vertex [23] , and its computational complexity is bounded by
where C is encoded bits of a ik .
VII. HARD TO MANIPULATE
Here, we attempt to break the assumption where bidders are risk neutral by proposing a HMA. Instead of performing a single greedy algorithm, we attempt local improvements in the ordering of the bidders. Specifically, we repeatedly improve the solution quality by making a single change on the order of the bids and run a greedy algorithm on the modified order. The improvements can improve social welfare and spectrum utilization. However, such an efficient allocation algorithm will not guarantee the monotonicity, which makes the payment scheme hard to be designed to ensure truthfulness. We solve the problem by moving the difficulty of manipulation from the mechanism to the manipulators. We adopt a concept of hard to manipulate that states the problem of computing a useful nontruthful bid given knowledge of the bids from other agents is NP-hard.
Specifically, we perform hill-climbing based on ETEX, and the corresponding mechanism are referred as to HMA, In the following, we give the allocation rule and the pricing scheme accordingly.
A. HMA Allocation Rules
The allocation algorithm proceeds in two phases: In the first phase, we sequentially allocate the channels to bidders according to the sorted LP solutions. This phase is the ETEX-Allocation process. In the second phase, we perform a hill-climbing process based on the sorted bids in the first phase. The two steps of the allocation algorithm can be described as follows, and the detailed algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
• Step 1: Run ETEX-Allocation algorithm and record the obtained social welfare W (π), where π is the sorted bidder set according to sorted set B . • Step 2: For j = 2 to N , do the following.
-π ← (π with bidder j moved to first place).
-Sequentially allocate exact channels to bidders according to π while satisfying interference constraints. Let W (π ) denote the obtained social welfare on π . If W (π ) ≥ W (π), return the allocation on π .
Algorithm 3: HMA Allocation.
Input: The network, G(N , E);
The bids vector, b;
The demands vector, d; Output:
A feasible spectrum allocation; 1: Run ETEX-Allocation and record the social welfare W (π); 2: Initial π as the ordered bidder set according to sorted set B in ETEX-Allocation; 3: for j = 2 to N do 4:
π ← (π with element j moved to first place); 5:
Sequentially allocate exact channels to bidders according to π and record the social welfare W (π );
return the allocation on π ; 8: end if 9: end for 10: return the allocation on π;
Due to the local improvement is performed, the monotonicity will not be guaranteed. As a result, a threshold payment does not exist for ensuring the truthfulness. We therefore redesign the payment scheme based on the VCG payment scheme.
B. A VCG-Based Payment Scheme
The idea of the pricing scheme is similar with the VCG mechanism. Intuitively, the payment of winner i is the social welfare for everyone else without i in the system minus that for everyone else with i in the system. For easy description, we use H to denote the above HMA allocation algorithm; then, the price p i we charge from each winner i is
where the items W H (b −i ) and W H (b) are the social welfare of H running on the bids b −i and bids b, respectively.
C. Property Analysis
Since our heuristic approach HMA is not optimal; thus, the truthfulness will not be guaranteed due to the limitation of the VCG mechanism. However, we show manipulating such an auction of a bidder for profit gaining will be hard. We first define the manipulation problem and then prove that it is NP-hard.
Definition 3 (H Manipulation Problem):
For the spectrum auction, given bid set (d, b), where d is the vector of demands  (d 1 , . . . , d N ) and b is the vector of bids (b 1 , . . . , b N ), returning  a bid (d i ,b i ) gives bidder i at least ( > 0) additional utility than what it would have received from being truthful in that auction or outputting "impossible" if no such manipulation exists.
Definition 4 (Simple-Case H Manipulation Problem): Consider a simple case for the spectrum auction where conflict graph is complete graph. Given bid set (d, b) , returning a bid (d i ,b i ) gives bidder i at least ( > 0) additional utility than what it would have received from being truthful in that auction, or outputting "impossible" if no such manipulation exists.
To prove the H manipulation problem is NP-hard, we just need to prove the simple-case H manipulation problem is NP-hard. A recent work [25] investigated the HMAs and considered the necessary properties of VCG-based auctions that will allow us to say that their manipulation is hard. The main result in [25] is that the allocation algorithm of a VCGbased auction satisfying the properties of greedy optimality (G-OPT) and strong consumer sovereignty (SCS) is the necessary condition on the auction that make manipulation NPhard, As an instance, the Sanghvi and Parkes showed that the condition is also the sufficient condition for the VCG-based combinatorial auction [26] , which is a classic economic auction. Inspired by this, we prove that the simple-case H manipulation problem is NP-hard by showing our allocation algorithm satisfying G-OPT and SCS, which are defined in the following.
Definition 5 (Greedy Optimality): An allocation algorithm satisfies greedy optimality if it ensures that the algorithm does not leave channels unassigned when other requests them, i.e., there does not exist a losing bidder whose demand d i is less than the available channels, and does not assign more channels than that it requests, i.e., a bidder obtains either exact d i channels or zero channel.
Definition 6 (Strong Consumer Sovereignty): An allocation algorithm satisfies strong consumer sovereignty if there does not exit a single bidder would contribute more social welfare than the total value the algorithm achieves, i.e., there does not exist a bidder i with b i > W , where W is the total social welfare achieved by the algorithm.
Based on the definitions, we can prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5: The allocation algorithm H satisfies greedy optimality.
Proof: First, the allocation algorithm H scans through the bid set and allocates channels to bidders that can be allocated to. At the end, either all bidders are allocated to or any remaining bidders could not possibly be allocated to the given current allocation. Second, since we adopt the strict request here, we allocate the exact d i or zero channels to bidder i. This completes the proof.
Lemma 6:
The allocation algorithm H Satisfies strong consumer sovereignty.
Proof: We assume that there exists a bidder i whose b i > W , where W is the total social welfare achieved by the allocation algorithm H. If bidder i wins in the allocation, then W must contain the b i , which indicates W ≥ b i and leads to a contradiction. If i loses in the allocation, then by Step 2 of H, bidder i will win the auction, which leads to a contradiction. Now, we provide a simple NP-hard problem (see Lemma 7) , and then we show how to deduce the simple-case H manipulation problem to it.
Lemma 7: The following problem (simple-case winner determination) is NP-hard: Consider the simple case for the spectrum auction where conflict graph G is complete graph, determining whether an allocation can achieve V total valuation (social welfare) and outputting that allocation if it exists.
Proof: The simple case of spectrum auction with maximizing social welfare can be reduced to classic 0/1 knapsack problem, where bid is equivalent to "value" and demand is equivalent to "weight." Therefore, the given problem is equivalent to the decision form of the classic 0/1 knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-hard. Now we can prove that the simple-case H manipulation problem is NP-hard by deducing it to the simple-case winner determination problem.
Theorem 3: The simple-case H manipulation problem is NP-hard.
Proof: Suppose the simple-case manipulation problem could be solved in polynomial time. We provide a polynomial time solution to simple-case winner determination.
Denote θ as a vector ((d 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , (d N , v N ) ), where N is the number of bidders. First, run the allocation algorithm on θ. Let the total valuation of the result be x. If x ≥ V , then we are done: Output "yes" and return the allocation, where V is the total valuation. We suppose otherwise, i.e., V > x.
. We know that V > x; thus, V − > x (since is of arbitrarily small precision). Therefore, when run on θ , the allocation algorithm will allocate total K channels to N + 1 by SCS. Since no one else can be allocated to, agent N + 1's payment is x, and its utility is V − x − . Now, we prove the main reduction: θ has an allocation achieving V total valuation if and only if bidder N + 1 can achieve at least units of manipulating in θ . Since the next derivation process is similar with that of VCG-based combinatorial auction in [25] , we omit it here.
Based on the above understanding, we claim the H manipulation problem is NP-hard.
Theorem 4:
The H manipulation problem is NP-hard. Proof: Since the H manipulation problem generalizes the simple-case H manipulation problem, it is only harder.
Computational Complexity: We now analyze the computational complexity of HMA. The complexity of HMA allocation consists of two parts, i.e., Steps 1 and 2. The complexity that comes from Step 1 is the complexity of ETEX-Allocation, i.e., O(L + N log N + N 2 ) plus the time consumed by the LP process. The complexity comes from Step 2, which needs at most N 2 times of the assigning and updating process. This step needs
To charge each winner in the pricing scheme, we need to run the HMA allocation algorithm once again without the BFS procedure. Therefore, the total complexity of HMA is time O(L + N 2 log N + N 3 + N 4 ) plus + 1 times of the time consumed by the LP process with bounded K × N parameters, where is the number of winners in the auction.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Here, we use simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of the approximately truthful mechanisms.
A. Simulation Methodology 1) Network topology. We assume a single auctioneer that conducts an auction in a relatively small geographic area. Bidders are randomly deployed in a square of 1 × 1 area. We vary the network density by varying the number of bidders from 50 to 500 (the default is 300). To generate the interference graph, we set the interference range as 0.1, i.e., if the distance between any two bidders is less than 0.1, they will interfere with each other when using the same channel simultaneously. 2) Channels, bids, and demands. We set up an auction of total channels varying from 2 to 20 with the default being six channels. The per-channel bid of bidder i (i.e., 
B. Approximately Truthful Versus Truthful
We now evaluate the performance on the approximately truthful mechanisms by comparing them with VERITAS [14] and the method in [21] (referred to as SW-Fair). VERITAS is one of the most famous SSA with the objective of maximizing social welfare. VERITAS consists of a greedy allocation algorithm and a critical-value-based pricing method. SW-Fair is also a greedy-based mechanism. Here, we describe these mechanisms briefly in the following.
VERITAS-Allocation: First, the per-channel bids of all bidders are sorted from high to low, and then the algorithm allocates exact channels to bidders sequentially from the bidder with the highest bid to the lowest one. For each bidder i, the algorithm first checks whether there are enough channels to satisfy the request while satisfying interference constraints. If so, the request of bidder i is satisfied; otherwise, it means the opposite. SW-Fair is similar with VERITAS, whereas SW-Fair aims to achieve a tradeoff between social welfare and fairness. The main difference between SW-Fair and VERITAS is that SWFair considers the impact to neighboring nodes when sorting bidders, i.e., SW-Fair sorts the bidders by the computed virtual bid, which is defined as (b i /|N(i)| + 1) for bidder i, where |N(i)| is the number of i's neighbors. The detailed algorithm can is shown in [21] . Now, we compare VERITAS and SW-Fair with our mechanisms. The key distinction between them is that our mechanisms seek to improve the efficiency in terms of social welfare and spectrum usage. We compare these mechanisms in three scenarios. First, we fix the number of auctioned channels (K = 6) and vary the number of bidders from 50 to 500. Second, we fix the number of bidders N = 300 and vary the number of auctioned channels from 2 to 20. In the above two scenarios, the demand of each bidder d i is randomly chosen from the interval [1, K] , where K is the total number of available channels. Finally, we fix the demand of each bidder (d i = 2), fix the number of bidders (N = 300), and vary the number of auctioned channels from 2 to 20.
We plot the results in Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and Fig. 5 . From these results, we observe the following. First, ETEX and HMA outperform slightly VERITAS by about 23% and 27% in average, respectively. Second, the hill-climbing increases the efficiency (social welfare and spectrum utilization) by about 4% in average. Third, our mechanisms perform slightly better than SW-Fair, but when the number of bidders increases, SWFair performs better than ETE, although it is slightly worse than HMA [see Figs. 3(a) and 4(a) ]. This is because the impact of neighboring nodes when allocation is enlarged when the number of bidders increases (i.e., more bidders would conflict). Fourth, in the first two scenarios, the performance gap increases with the growth in the number of bidders (channels). The main reason for the increased performance of our methods is due to the higher bidder satisfaction that we plot in Fig. 5 . That is, more bidders succeed in our mechanisms. The performance gap increases as the number of bidders (auctioned channels) grows confirmed the intuition that the LP-based allocation methods perform well since LP takes mutual interference between neighbors into consideration when allocating. This intuition is also confirmed in [31] . In the third scenario, the performance gap decreases with the growth in the number of channels. This is because more bidders can be satisfied, and they can be all allocated with channels when the number of channels is large enough. Finally, the metric of bidder satisfaction reflects the fairness of these mechanisms when we use the Jain's fairness index [34] to quantify the fairness of our mechanisms. The Jain's fairness index is computed as
, where X i denotes the allocation of bidder i
Because we adopt a strict request model in our context, i.e., X i is a binary variable that indicates whether i wins or loses. As a result, the Jain's fairness index here means the bidder satisfaction. Therefore, we claim that our mechanisms perform better than other methods in terms of fairness by the results in Fig. 5 .
C. Further Improvements on Hill Climbing
Recall that the local improvements method in HMA, where we just simply move the element j (j = 1, . . . , N) to the first place. Here, we tried a further improvement where two elements (i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = i + 1, . . . , N) are moved to the first and second positions in the order accordingly. We referred this modified mechanism as HMA-CH2. We compared the performance of the two variants of improvements. The results are given in Fig. 6 . From the results, we observe that the performance gap is no more than 2%, whereas the two element variation costs more computational complexity than our simple improvement. 
D. Compare to the Optimal Solution
Here, we now compare the performance derived from our proposed heuristic approaches to the optimal value. Given the complexity of the exhaustive search scales exponentially with the number of bidders, we use two typical topologies (see Fig. 7 ) with a limited number of bidders and channels. Topologies I and II are two extreme topologies: a star topology with one vertex interferes with the rest and a ring topology with uniformed interference condition.
Figs. 8 and 9 summarize the results for 20-node ring topology and 20-node star topology, assuming two channels are auctioned. Results are represented as a mean of ten runs. We observe that our proposed approaches achieve similar performance compared with the global optimal.
Following that, we also consider a set of small random topologies assuming two channels to be auctioned to 20 bidders. For a clear illustration, we evaluate the performance by computing the performance loss compared with the optimum. If the obtained result is T and the global optimum is T opt , the performance loss is defined as 1 − T /T opt . This definition is natural and can measure the difference of performance provided by our mechanisms and the global optimum. We summarized the results averaged over 100 random topologies in Table I . We observe that our mechanism HMA provides the better approximation compared with other methods again.
Overall, our methods provide better approximation compared to VERITAS. This is because our methods are based on LP solutions that take mutual influence between neighboring bidders into consideration and thus achieve better approximation. 
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the SSA with a single seller and multiple buyers (bidders). We release the burden of ensuring the hard truthfulness by introducing the concept of approximate truthfulness. We have shown that finding the optimal spectrum allocation under strict request model is NP-hard. To solve this problem, we first provide a suboptimal algorithm that is shown to be monotone. To minimize the computational overhead, we propose a novel pricing scheme to ensure the mechanism containing the monotone algorithm along with the pricing scheme achieving truthful in expectation. Following that, we perform hill-climbing based on the monotone algorithm, which improves the social welfare and spectrum utilization but breaks the monotonicity. Although the novel pricing scheme is no longer suitable, we have shown that it is an HMA when combining with a VCG-based payment scheme. Compared with the mechanism achieving truthful in expectation, the HMA breaks the assumption that bidders are risk neutral and improves the allocating efficiency. Theoretical analysis shows the computational efficiency of these approximately truthful mechanisms, and simulation results show that our approximately truthful mechanisms can achieve significant improvement over the state-of-the-art mechanisms.
